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Abstract
The current state of much of the Wuhan pneumonia virus (severe acute respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus 2 [SARS-CoV-2]) research shows a regrettable lack of data sharing
and considerable analytical obfuscation. This impedes global research cooperation,
which is essential for tackling public health emergencies and requires unimpeded access
to data, analysis tools, and computational infrastructure. Here, we show that community
efforts in developing open analytical software tools over the past 10 years, combined with
national investments into scientific computational infrastructure, can overcome these
deficiencies and provide an accessible platform for tackling global health emergencies in
an open and transparent manner. Specifically, we use all SARS-CoV-2 genomic data
available in the public domain so far to (1) underscore the importance of access to raw
data and (2) demonstrate that existing community efforts in curation and deployment of
biomedical software can reliably support rapid, reproducible research during global health
crises. All our analyses are fully documented at https://github.com/galaxyproject/SARS-
CoV-2.
The initial publications describing genomic features of SARS-CoV-2 [1–4] used Illumina and
Oxford nanopore data to elucidate the sequence composition of patient specimens (although
only Wu and colleagues [3] explicitly provided the accession numbers for their raw short-read
sequencing data). However, their approaches to processing, assembly, and analysis of raw data
differed widely (Table 1) and ranged from transparent [3] to entirely opaque [4]. Such lack of
analytical transparency sets a dangerous precedent. Infectious disease outbreaks often occur in
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locations where infrastructure necessary for data analysis may be inaccessible or unbiased
interpretation of results may be politically untenable. As a consequence, there is a global need
to ensure access to free, open, and robust analytical approaches that can be used by anyone in
the world to analyze, interpret, and share data. Can existing tools and computational resources
support such a global need? Here, we show that they can: we analyzed all available raw SARS-
CoV-2 data to demonstrate that analyses described in [1–4] can be reproduced on public infra-
structure using open-source tools by any researcher with an internet connection.
We exclusively used free software tools publicly available from the BioConda package distri-
bution system [5], which were deployed through the worldwide network of open Galaxy plat-
forms [6] and executed using public high-throughput computational infrastructure (XSEDE in
the United States, VSC in Belgium, de.NBI, and ELIXIR in the European Union, NeCTAR
Research Cloud in Australia). We also used an open-source Jupyter environment [7] for
exploratory analysis of data. All analyses performed here are fully documented and accessible
at https://github.com/galaxyproject/SARS-CoV-2/ and https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.
3685264 (note that these are being continuously updated).
We divided our analysis into the following stages: (1) read preprocessing, (2) genome
assembly, (3) timing the most recent common ancestor (MRCA), (4) analysis of genomic vari-
ation within individual samples, and (5) recombination and selection analyses.
We preprocessed currently available (as of February 19, 2020) sequencing read data sets for
SARS-CoV-2 (S1 Table) by removing adapter contamination and reads derived from human
transcripts and combined the resulting data sets. This was done to SARS-CoV-2–specific
reads, which constitute only a fraction of the original data. These were used as inputs for
SPAdes assembler [8] and Unicycler [9]—an assembly pipeline based on SPAdes that includes
a number of preprocessing and polishing steps. Both approaches were able to reconstruct a
full-length SARS-CoV-2 genome, with Unicycler producing a cleaner assembly graph. Its larg-
est contig (29,781 bp) had 100% identity to the published assembly NC_045512.
Next, we estimated the date of the MRCA of SARS-CoV-2. For this, we used simple root-
to-tip regression [10] (more complex and powerful phylodynamics methods could certainly be
used, but for these data with very low levels of sequence divergence, simpler and faster meth-
ods suffice). Using a set of sequences (we removed identical genomes by retaining only one
representative from a set of identical sequences) from all SARS-CoV-2 sequences available as
of February 16, 2020, we obtained an MRCA date of October 24, 2019, which is close to other
existing estimates [11].
Table 1. Methods used for the analysis of primary SARS-CoV-2 data.
Analysis stage Publication






















Versions specified + + + +
Parameters specified − − − −
Raw data + ? − −
? = uncertain (e.g., Holshue and colleagues [4] identify FreeBayes as an assembly tool).
Abbreviation: SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008643.t001
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The vast majority of SARS-CoV-2 genomic data available at the time of writing are partially
or fully assembled genomes. There is no public access to sequence reads that were used to pro-
duce these assemblies: as of February 19, 2020—more than 2 months since the beginning of
the outbreak—there were only six raw data sets (S1 Table).
This should be unacceptable because raw read data can be used to uncover viral diversity
within individual samples and evaluate robustness and reliability of the assembly. To demon-
strate that such diversity exists, we mapped Illumina reads against SARS-CoV-2 reference
(NC_045512) and identified sequence variants with frequencies above 5% while taking into
account quality of alternative bases and strand bias. Five percent was selected as a conservative
threshold that can be reliably resolved from Illumina data [12]. Using this threshold, 39 single
nucleotide variants (SNVs) were identified in total across all samples (Fig 1). The most promi-
nent sequence variant was observed in sample SRR10903401. It is an A-to-C substitution with
alternate allele frequency of 38% that causes a Lys921Gln amino acid replacement within the
spike glycoprotein S (product of gene S). S is a homotrimeric protein containing S1 and S2
subdomains, which mediate receptor recognition and membrane fusion, respectively [13]. S2
subdomains contain two heptad repeat (repeats of units containing seven amino acids)
regions: HR1 and HR2. The Lys921Gln substitution we observed is located in HR1 and forms a
salt bridge with Gln1188 within HR2. This is one in a series of salt bridges involved in the for-
mation of the HR1/HR2 hairpin structures [14]. This site invariably contains Lys in all human
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-related coronaviruses (S protein residue 903) as
well as in many other coronaviruses (Fig 2). However, more distantly related coronaviruses,
including transmissible gastroenteritis coronavirus (TGEV), the porcine respiratory coronavi-
rus (PRCV), the canine coronavirus (CCV), the feline peritonitis virus (FIPV), and the porcine
epidemic diarrhea virus (PDEV), all contain Gln at the corresponding position ([14] and Fig
2). The Lys921Gln change would prevent the formation of the salt bridge with Gln1188 and may
have structural and functional implications for the spike protein structure and, consequently,
SARS-CoV-2 virulence. This potentially adaptive change was not observed in the other two
samples, and a lack of raw read data prevented us from identifying it in other geographically
and temporally distributed samples.
To detect potential genome rearrangement events that might have led to the emergence of
SARS-CoV-2, we performed analysis of recombination using a genetic algorithm approach
[15]. Wu and colleagues [3] identified two potential recombination breakpoints within the
SARS-CoV-2 S gene with some segments having higher similarity to Bat ZC45 and ZXC21
Fig 1. Distribution of nucleotide changes across SARS-CoV-2 genome. AF, minor allele frequency; POS, position; SARS-CoV-2,
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008643.g001
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coronaviruses (accessions MG772933 and MG772934, respectively), whereas others were
more similar to SARS Tor2 and SZ3 isolates (accessions AY274119 and AY304486). Our
attempt at reproducing this analysis did identify a set of potential breakpoints similar to the
ones reported by Wu and colleagues [3], but they lacked robust statistical support (Fig 3).
Fig 2. Amino acid alignment of spike glycoprotein regions HR1 (A) and HR2 (B). The site of the Lys921Gln substitution observed by
us in a SARS-CoV-2 isolate is highlighted with a black rectangle in panel A. Its corresponding salt bridge partner is highlighted with a
black rectangle in panel B. SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008643.g002
Fig 3. Location of potential recombination breakpoints along the S gene (GARD analysis).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008643.g003
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Finally, we performed a branch-level test for positive selection on a codon alignment of the
S gene from SARS-CoV-2, SARS-Tor2, as well as Bat ZC45, ZXC21, and Rp3 coronaviruses,
specifically to identify whether there was any evidence of diversifying selection along the
ancestral branch leading to SARS-CoV-2 isolates. We found statistically significant evidence of
positive diversifying selection (approximately 7% of S gene sites) along the branch leading to
SARS-CoV-2 (Fig 4).
The goal of our study was to (1) raise awareness of the lack of primary data necessary to
effectively respond to global emergencies such as the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)
outbreak and (2) demonstrate that all analyses can be performed transparently with already-
existing open-source publicly available tools and computational infrastructure. The first prob-
lem—reluctance to share primary data—has its roots in the fact that the ultimate reward for
research efforts is a highly cited publication. As a result, individual researchers are naturally
averse to sharing primary data prior to manuscript acceptance. The second issue—underutili-
zation of existing, community-supported tools and analysis frameworks—may be due to the
lack of sustained efforts to educate the biomedical community about appropriate practices in
(genomic) data analysis. Such efforts exist (e.g., [16]) but have difficulties reaching a wide audi-
ence because prominent scientific publication outlets are reluctant to accept data analysis tuto-
rials or reviews. Yet the only way to improve accessibility and reproducibility of biomedical
research is through dissemination of appropriate analysis practices.
We want to particularly emphasize the issue of irreproducibility. All researchers involved in
any given outbreak research should have access to a set of community-curated tools in the
same way as they have access to SARS-CoV-2 real-time PCR (RT-PCR) primers [17]. More-
over, they should have access to computational infrastructure that can execute these tools and
apply them to potentially large next-generation sequencing (NGS) data sets. This is essential
because precious time is spent on “reinventing the wheel.” Instead, in an ideal world, after
reading any of the original SARS-CoV-2 manuscripts, any researcher should be able to apply
the same analytical procedures to their own data. To illustrate these points, we assessed the
reproducibility of the four initial manuscripts describing the SARS-CoV-2 genome (S1 Table).
All manuscripts reported versions of the software used, but none listed parameters used. This
effectively prevents quality control and replication because outcomes of complex procedures
such as genome assembly, phylogenetic reconstruction, and recombination analysis are notori-
ously parameter dependent. One of the manuscripts [4] explicitly lists FreeBayes [18], a variant
discovery tool, as software used for short-read assembly—something that FreeBayes is not
capable of doing. Finally, only [3] provided access to the raw data, rendering the other three
manuscripts unverifiable and irreproducible.
Our short study demonstrates that viral genome analyses can be performed using open
worldwide scientific infrastructure that relies entirely on community-curated and -supported
open-source software. Although we used Galaxy as the platform to execute all analyses
described here, the individual software components can be obtained directly from BioConda
and run independently. They can be combined into workflows using systems like the Com-
mon Workflow Language (CWL) [19], Nextflow [20], or Snakemake [21]. Whatever the
Fig 4. Analysis of branch-specific positive diversifying selection (aBSREL) along the branch leading to
SARS-CoV-2 (MN988688). SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008643.g004
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execution environment or workflow engine, using community-supported, versioned, open-
source tools makes data analyses robust and transparent. This increases the quality, efficiency,
and ultimately, impact of biomedical research.
In an age of digital connectedness, open, highly accessible, globally shared data and analysis
platforms have the potential to transform the way biomedical research is done, opening the
way to “global research markets” in which competition arises from deriving understanding
rather than access to samples and data. Other disciplines have embraced the benefits of global
data generation and sharing—astronomy and high-energy physics being two highly successful
examples. We have the opportunity to mirror their successes in infrastructure funding by dem-
onstrating that biological research can embrace the same global perspective on common infra-
structure investment and data sharing.
Changes during review process
The review and publication process of the original version of this manuscript took approxi-
mately 5 months. During this time the number of available data sets increased significantly
(see https://covid19.galaxyproject.org for the latest results). As of July 31, 2020, the number of
available raw read data sets for SARS-CoV-2 was 28,973—a significant increase over the num-
ber described in the beginning of this manuscript. However, it is still a fraction of the data:
there were ~75,000 assembled genomes in GISAID on the day the proofs were submitted.
Until the raw data are released, we will have no ability to validate available assemblies, and any
talk about unobstructed analysis of SARS-CoV-2 has no merit. This is not the way serious sci-
ence is done.
Methods
Our data and analyses are constantly updated. Exact methods and tool versions are available
from https://covid19.galaxyproject.org. This repository contains six directories, corresponding
to the analyses we have performed: (1) data preprocessing, (2) genome assembly, (3) estima-
tion of MRCA timing, (4) analysis of intrahost variation, (5) analysis of substitutions within
the S gene, and (6) analysis of recombination and selection. Every page begins with links to
workflows and histories at four Galaxy instances in the US (http://usegalaxy.org), EU (http://
usegalaxy.eu), Belgium (http://usegalaxy.be), and Australia (http://usegalaxy.org.au). Exact
versions of tools used in the analysis are provided at the end of each section.
Supporting information
S1 Table. Raw SARS-CoV-2 sequencing data available at the time of writing (Feb 20,
2020). �Indicates that data may not be reliable (for example, the link between SRR10903402
and [1] is inferred: neither the SRA record nor the manuscript establishes this relationship).
On February 21, 2020 new human data sets SRR11092056, SRR11092057, SRR11092058, and
SRR11092064 were added to the SARS-CoV-2 archive [22]. Our analyses indicate that these
data sets contain no useful SARS-CoV-2 data [23]. BALF, bronchoalveolar lavage fluid; SARS-
CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; SRA, Sequence Read Archive.
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